

































n the aftermath of the financial crisis, much atten-
tion has been focused on the role of mortgage 
finance in house-price dynamics.
1 The subprime-
mortgage crisis that began in 2007 in the United 
States is an extreme example of how easing finan-
cing conditions can amplify a housing market boom 
and leave the financial system highly vulnerable to 
a bust in house prices.
2 Boom-bust cycles in real 
estate markets are a common precursor to banking 
crises in advanced and emerging economies 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009); the most severe and 
costly busts, in terms of lost gross domestic product 
(GDP), arise when the real estate boom is associ-
ated with the increased leverage of households and 
financial institutions (Crowe et al. 2011). Claessens, 
Kose and Terrones (2008) show that recessions that 
coincide with housing busts tend to last longer and 
be deeper than recessions where no housing bust 
has occurred. They find that, on average, the cumu-
lative loss to GDP is roughly three times as large 
when a housing bust coincides with a recession. The 
high macroeconomic costs of a bust are due to the 
relatively high direct exposure of the financial system 
to real estate and to the resulting knock-on effects of 
financial system losses to the rest of the economy. 
A rising supply of credit, often caused by some form 
of financial liberalization or technological innovation, 
is a characteristic feature of a real estate boom. A 
key mechanism for the boom is feedback between 
rising house prices and household debt that is cre-
ated because homeowners are able to use their 
houses as collateral. Rising house prices increase 
the value of a household’s collateral and expand 
the capacity of households to accumulate debt. If 
new debt leads to further spending on real estate, 
1  Similar concerns exist for commercial real estate.
2  Other notable examples are the boom-bust cycles in the Nordic coun-
tries and the United Kingdom between the mid-1980s and early 1990s 
and, more recently, in the United Kingdom and Spain.
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The presence of this effect is associated with greater 
procyclicality in the housing market. In addition, 
some portion of this increased debt capacity may 
also finance non-housing consumption. In this case, 
higher household indebtedness increases the risk of 
default when income falls during the bust phase of 
the cycle. Other factors that are likely to reinforce the 
procyclical movements of house prices are positive 
views on the outlook for the economy and the pres-
ence of capital inflows from abroad that amplify the 
boom (Tomura 2010). 
In an effort to reduce procyclicality in real estate 
markets and the magnitude of booms and busts, a 
number of countries have altered key elements in their 
regulation of housing finance (CGFS 2010; Wong et 
al. 2011). Many more are considering such measures 
(FSB 2011). One area of focus is the appropriate set-
ting of the upper cap or maximum loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratio, which defines the minimum down payment 
required to obtain a mortgage for a house purchase. 
A high LTV ratio allows the borrower to tap into more 
debt for a $1 rise in collateral value. This article exam-
ines a maximum LTV ratio on mortgages through the 
lens of a model developed in Christensen et al. (2009) 
and Christensen and Meh (forthcoming). This model 
provides an environment in which to examine mort-
gage market regulation, because it features a housing 
market and borrowing-constrained households that 
can borrow up to a specified fraction of the value of 





The article begins with a description of the evidence 
linking housing booms and procyclicality to rising 
household credit and leverage. It then reviews some 
of the policies being considered to dampen boom-
bust cycles in real estate, notably the LTV ratio on 
mortgages. The model is then described and used 
to consider how permanent changes in the LTV 
ratio alter the feedback effects associated with pro-
cyclicality and the effect of reducing the maximum 
LTV ratio in the face of a rising credit supply. 
Housing Booms and the  
LTV Ratio in Canada 
Canada has not been a stranger to real estate 
booms and busts in the past: one occurred in the 
mid-1970s and another in the late 1980s (Ahearne et 
al. 2005). Both had long-lasting impacts on the bal-
ance sheets of Canadian financial intermediaries. In 
fact, the large losses on mortgage loans that trust 
companies experienced during the 1980s were one 
of the factors that led to their ultimate demise. The 
impact on the financial system reflects its exposure 
to real estate. Since the late 1960s, mortgages and 
other debt secured by real estate have averaged 
more than 35 per cent of total private sector credit 
outstanding, and this share has risen over time to its 
current level of more than 57 per cent.
3 
Over the past three years, the Government of 
Canada has adopted a number of changes to the 
rules for government-backed insured mortgages,
4 
with the objective of supporting “the long-term 
stability of Canada’s housing market”
5 and “to help 
prevent Canadian households from getting over-
extended, and acting to prevent some lenders from 
facilitating [this].”
6 These changes have resulted in 
lower maximum LTV ratios of 95 per cent for new 
government-backed insured mortgages, 85 per 
cent for mortgage refinancing, and 80 per cent for 
non-owner-occupied properties. These changes 
follow a relaxation of the first two rules between 
2004 and 2007.
Allen (2010–11) shows that from 1999 to 2004 most 
households with insured mortgages borrowed up to, 
or near, the maximum LTV ratio available at the time 
they purchased a home. Thus, in that period, the 
typical LTV ratio for a newly issued insured mortgage 
was in the range of 90 to 95 per cent. This suggests 
that changes to the maximum LTV ratio could have 
significant effects on housing markets.
3  This includes residential and non-residential mortgages and lines 
of credit secured by real estate. The share is a proportion of credit 
outstanding and excludes equity, warrants and trust units. All data are 
from the Bank	of	Canada	Banking	and	Financial	Statistics. If we exclude 
insured mortgages, for which the banks do not bear the losses from 
default, this number is about 48 per cent in the first quarter of 2011. 
This measure does not include direct exposures to construction and 
building-sector loans. 
4  In Canada, the Bank Act states that federally regulated financial institu-
tions cannot offer mortgages with an LTV ratio higher than 80 per cent, 
unless that mortgage is insured by a government agency (Canada Mort-
gage and Housing Corporation) or private insurer. Mortgage insurance 
backed by the federal government is available for mortgages with LTV 
ratios up to 95 per cent.
5  Government of Canada, press release, 17 January 2011.
6  Government of Canada, press release, 16 February 2010.
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Procyclicality: Selected Evidence
Research from a number of countries finds an 
important relationship between mortgage finance 
and developments in the housing market—a critical 
link in the U.S. subprime-mortgage crisis, as well 
as the boom and bust in the United Kingdom (FSB 
2011).
Empirical evidence confirms the importance of 
mortgage market rules for macroeconomic fluctua-
tions. Almeida, Campello and Liu (2006) show that 
countries with high maximum LTV ratios are those in 
which house prices and the demand for new mort-
gage borrowing are most sensitive to income shocks 
(i.e., procyclicality is the strongest). Lamont and 
Stein (1999) have similar findings for U.S. cities with 
a large proportion of highly leveraged (high LTV ratio) 
households.
Studies based on microdata have also investigated 
the link between housing finance and household 
behaviour. Using U.S. credit bureau data and zip-
code-level data on house prices, Mian and Sufi 
(2009a) find evidence that U.S. banks increased 
the availability of credit to first-time home buyers 
and that this was a key driver of rising household 
leverage between 2002 and 2005. In addition, 
rising house prices allowed existing homeowners 
to increase their debt levels dramatically (Mian and 
Sufi 2009b). The authors document that home-
owners extracting equity from their homes during the 
period of rising house prices experienced a jump in 
default rates as house prices reversed (Mian and Sufi 
2009b). This research shows that the feedback effect 
between house prices and household debt is clearly 







Finally, Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1999) develop a 
model with young and old households, as well as a 
property ladder, whereby people seek to move from 
apartments to houses as they age. A key finding is 
that the rise in owner occupancy and house prices 
during the U.K.’s housing boom in the 1980s can be 
at least partly explained by credit market liberaliza-
tion, as captured by an increase in the LTV ratio. An 
alternative hypothesis, that the boom resulted from 
rising household incomes, cannot explain these 
facts.
Together, these studies suggest that the maximum 
limit on the LTV ratio on a residential mortgage could 
play a useful role in moderating procyclical move-
ments in house prices and housing market activity.
A Model to Capture Links 
Between Housing Finance  
and the Real Economy
Christensen et al. (2009) develop and estimate a 
dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) 
model for Canada (referred to as CCMN, after the 
authors’ names—Christensen, Corrigan, Mendicino 
and Nishiyama), featuring borrower and lender house-
holds and a housing market. As in Iacoviello (2005), 
borrowers and lenders are distinguished by their 
impatience: impatient households seek to consume 
more today and borrow from patient households. 
Differing degrees of impatience across household 
types is a common modelling device to allow bor-
rowing and lending to occur. It captures some of the 
differences in household behaviour over the life cycle, 
where impatient households resemble the young, and 
patient households the old who have accumulated 
more wealth. Loan contracts in this model specify that 
borrowers can borrow up to a fraction of the value of 
their real estate holdings (the LTV ratio). This type of 
contract often arises in models where the financial 
friction takes the form of an enforcement problem: 
lenders require borrowers to post collateral in view of 
the risk that they may not repay the loan. Importantly, 
when this collateral constraint is present, rising house 
prices lead to a higher value of collateral, giving 
households greater access to credit and allowing 
them to increase their expenditures on consumption 
and housing. Christensen et al. (2009) find that this 
mechanism helps the model to better capture the 
empirical relationship between the time series data for 
house prices and consumption.
Like many models of its type, CCMN does not cap-
ture the decision of households to default, which 
is a key element of financial system vulnerability. 
In contrast to Meh (2011) and de Resende and 
Lalonde (2011), there is no explicit role in the model 
for banks to act as intermediaries for credit, since 
loans are contracts between lender households and 
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loan losses can lead to banking sector stresses, 
tighter lending standards and further amplification 
during the bust phase of the cycle. Though styl-
ized in these respects, the model does capture the 
feedback between house prices and household debt 
accumulation that drives the procyclicality of the 
housing market and, as noted above, is the motiva-
tion for some of the recent changes to housing-
finance policy in Canada. The following sections 
focus on the role that this mechanism plays in the 
boom phase.
The LTV Ratio and Spillovers  
from the Housing Market 
Given the presence of collateral-constrained house-
holds, the level of the LTV ratio on mortgage lending 
is one factor that determines the extent of pro-
cyclicality in the housing market. In this case, it is 
useful to consider economic shocks that may arise 
in the housing market itself and lead to changes 
in the price of housing. For example, a number of 
researchers have studied the impact of shocks to 
housing demand on the housing sector and on the 
overall economy.
7 Iacoviello and Neri (2010) find that 
housing-demand shocks play an important role in 
capturing the swings in U.S. house prices in a two-
sector monetary DSGE model. Jarocin ´ski and Smets 
(2008) find that this type of shock can account for 
a significant fraction of the U.S. boom in construc-
tion and house prices, but its effect on overall GDP 
growth and inflation is relatively small. 
Chart 1 illustrates the economy’s response to a 
positive shock to housing demand in the CCMN 
model. This shock is captured as a sudden shift 
in the desire of households to consume housing 
services relative to other consumption goods or 
leisure. It can also be thought of as a rise in the 
return to residential investment. The higher demand 
for housing services increases housing investment. 
However, the stock of housing is slow to adjust, 
so there is a rise in house prices
8 and, thus, the 
value of housing that can be posted as collateral.
9 
Rising collateral values allow households to borrow 
more against the equity in their home to finance 
higher (non-housing) consumption in the short run. 
7  Housing-demand shocks are sometimes described as a shift in prefer-
ences toward housing services. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) discuss 
alternative interpretations.
8  Charts 1 and 2 show the price of housing relative to consumer prices.
9  In this example, the persistence of the house-price response is driven 
primarily by the high estimated persistence of the shock rather than by 
the intrinsic dynamics of house prices.
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consumption and repay this debt over time. 
In the case where the maximum LTV ratio is set to 
80 per cent, the model responses suggest that a 
1 per cent rise in house prices is associated with an 
increase of 0.1 per cent in consumption, which is 
close to the estimates of Iacoviello and Neri (2010) 
for the United States.
10 In the case where the max-
imum LTV ratio is 95 per cent, the initial response of 
consumption is three times larger. Chart 1 shows 
that a lower LTV ratio substantially reduces the mag-
nitude of the rise in consumption and household 
debt in response to a rise in house prices.
11 
A Countercyclical Policy for the 
LTV Ratio
Recent international discussions have begun to 
examine the merits of adjusting mortgage market 
rules over time. For example, country author-
ities could change the maximum LTV ratio in a 
10 In the model of Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the LTV ratio is 85 per cent. 
Our results are somewhat higher than the marginal propensity to 
consume from housing wealth for Canada of 5.7 per cent reported in 
Pichette (2004) and are in the upper range of estimates reported in 
Flood, Morin and Kolet (2008).  
11 The response of house prices to a housing-demand shock is not very 
sensitive to the level of the LTV ratio in this class of models. Neverthe-
less, the model captures important effects on quantities of changes 
in the LTV ratio, as can be seen from the boost to the consumption 
response of constrained households. Life-cycle effects and different 
dwelling types, both absent from this model, may be important in cap-
turing larger effects on house prices. For example, if the LTV ratio rises, 
young households with increased access to credit may bid up the price 
of starter homes, and this could increase the wealth of others and allow 
them to move up the property ladder.  
countercyclical fashion, lowering it during housing 
booms and raising it when house prices are 
depressed.
12 One outcome of this type of policy is 
an increase in the resilience of the fi  nancial system 
since it requires borrowers to have a larger equity 
stake in their property during booms, thus reducing 
the potential losses to fi  nancial intermediaries during 
the bust phase when income and house prices fall. 
In addition, the lower LTV ratio (higher down pay-
ment) would act against the boom in the fi  rst place 
by reducing the extent to which borrowers could 
extract equity from their homes or take on more 
leverage to buy a bigger home. 
Christensen and Meh (forthcoming) investigate the 
role of a time-varying maximum LTV ratio in a model 
based on Christensen et al. (2009).
13 They consider 
the impact when the public authorities respond to 
a credit boom by lowering the regulatory maximum 
LTV ratio below its long-run setting of 80 per cent.
The extent of the countercyclical response of the 
LTV ratio is determined by a regulatory rule that links 
the change in the LTV ratio to the level of mortgage 
credit relative to its long-run value. 
Housing booms and busts are often attributed, at 
least in part, to an easing of mortgage-underwriting 
conditions. We now turn to the case in which lenders 
themselves supply more credit and consider how the 
outcome might differ if the LTV ratio was lowered in 
response. 
Christensen and Meh (forthcoming) capture an 
increase in the availability of credit as an exogenous 
shift in the lender’s perception of the quality of 
housing collateral. Chart 2 illustrates the impact of 
a large shock, which raises the collateral value of a 
unit of housing by 5 per cent, when the LTV ratio is 
held constant at 80 per cent. With the increase in 
availability of debt, borrowers immediately increase 
their mortgage borrowing and use these funds to 
increase both consumption and housing expendi-
tures. The shock produces a growth rate of mort-
gage debt over the fi  rst year that is roughly in line 
with the average annual growth of mortgage debt 
seen during the housing boom in the United States 
in 2003–06. House prices rise in response to the 
increased demand for housing, raising the value of 
housing collateral and household debt capacity. 
12 Changing the capital-adequacy risk weights for residential mortgages 
is an alternative approach that has been suggested elsewhere (Borio, 
Furfi  ne and Lowe 2001; Bank of England 2009).
13 Research at other institutions has begun to consider related questions. 
See Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2009); Angelini, Neri and Panetta 
(2011); and Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2011).
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housing-demand shock is that there is little impact 
on consumer price inflation.
14 This is similar to the 
U.S. situation in the 2003–06 period, when a housing 
boom took hold but inflation remained subdued.
15 
There is only a small impact on inflation because the 
largest effects are mainly on borrowing-constrained 
households (a smaller group than lenders) and the 
housing market (a small sector), and because house-
holds supply more labour, which offsets some of the 
upward pressure on the cost of production.
16 The 
mild inflationary impact results in little response from 
14 The impact would be somewhat higher if the measure of inflation in the 
model included the direct impact of increases in house prices, as is the 
case for the Canadian consumer price index.
15 In the United States, offsetting shocks—for example, from lower import 
prices—also played a role.
16 Households supply more labour because the extra costs of working 
more hours are outweighed by the benefits from the extra income that 
can now purchase more housing services than before.
policy interest rates. The lack of a rise in interest 
rates allows mortgage borrowing and house prices 
to expand more strongly. 
Rather than holding the maximum LTV ratios on 
mortgage loans constant, there is the possibility of 
varying the maximum LTV ratio to stem the buildup 
of household debt. Chart 2 illustrates the responses 
to the credit-supply shock when the authorities lower 
the regulatory LTV ratio in response to the observed 
increase in mortgage credit that accompanies the 
shock. In this case, the drop in the maximum regu-
latory LTV ratio, which lasts for about 20 quarters, 
reduces the surge in mortgage debt by about two-
thirds. The rises in house prices and consump-
tion are reduced to about one-third of their peak 
response. Again, policy interest rates hardly move. In 
this model, the LTV ratio does not have to adjust by 
a large magnitude to achieve this dampening of the 
boom: it is lowered by about 2.8 percentage points 
Chart 2:  Economic impact of a countercyclical maximum LTV ratio after an increase in the availability of credit
Deviation from steady state
    Countercyclical LTV ratio  Constant LTV ratio = 80%
Chart 2:  Economic impact of a countercyclical 
maximum LTV ratio after an increase in the availability 
of credit
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Concluding Remarks
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In addition, many practical issues related to the 
implementation of countercyclical regulatory poli-
cies remain to be addressed; for example, under 
what circumstances should public authorities acti-
vate countercyclical policies, and how are they held 
accountable for achieving the objectives of these 
policies; which policy tools are most appropriate in a 
given situation; and what information should form the 
basis for that decision. These questions are of keen 
interest to policy-makers and offer fertile ground for 
future research. 
41 
MORTGAGE DEBT AND PROCYCLICALITY IN THE HOUSING MARKET 
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SUMMER 2011Bank of England. 2009. “The Role of 
Macroprudential Policy.” Bank of England 
Discussion Paper, 21 November.
Borio, C., C. Furfine and P. Lowe. 2001. 
“Procyclicality of the Financial System and 
Financial Stability: Issues and Policy Options.” 
In Marrying	the	Macro-	and	Microprudential	
Dimensions	of	Financial	Stability. BIS Papers 
No. 1.
Christensen, I., P. Corrigan, C. Mendicino and S. 
Nishiyama. 2009. “Consumption, Housing 
Collateral, and the Canadian Business Cycle.” 
Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2009-26.
Christensen, I. and C. Meh. Forthcoming. 
“Countercyclical Loan-to-Value Ratios and 
Monetary Policy.” Bank of Canada Working 
Paper.
Claessens, S., M. Kose and M. Terrones. 2008. 
“What Happens During Recessions, Crunches 
and Busts?” IMF Working Paper No. WP/08/274. 
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS). 
2010. “Macroprudential Instruments and 
Frameworks: A Stocktaking of Issues and 
Experiences.” CGFS Papers No. 38. 
Crowe, C., G. Dell’Ariccia, D. Igan and P. Rabanal. 
2011. “Policies for Macrofinancial Stability: 
Options to Deal with Real Estate Booms.” IMF 
Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/11/02. 
de Resende, C. and R. Lalonde. 2011. “The BoC-
GEM-Fin: Banking in the Global Economy.” Bank	
of	Canada	Review (this issue): 11–21.
Financial Stability Board (FSB). 2011. “Thematic 
Review on Mortgage Underwriting and 
Origination Practices.” Available at <http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_110318a.pdf>.
Flood, K., S. Morin and I. Kolet. 2008. “House Prices 
and Consumer Spending.” Bank	of	Canada	
Review (Summer): 31–44.
Iacoviello, M. 2005. “House Prices, Borrowing 
Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business 
Cycle.” American	Economic	Review 95 (3): 739–64.
Iacoviello, M. and S. Neri. 2010. “Housing Market 
Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated 
DSGE Model.” American	Economic	Journal:	
Macroeconomics 2 (2): 125–64.
Jarocin ´ski, M. and F. Smets. 2008. “House Prices 
and the Stance of Monetary Policy.” European 
Central Bank Working Paper No. 891.
Kannan, P., P. Rabanal and A. Scott. 2009. 
“Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy 
Rules in a Model with House Price Booms.” IMF 
Working Paper No. WP/09/251.
Lambertini, L., C. Mendicino and M. Punzi. 2011. 
“Leaning Against Boom-Bust Cycles in Credit 
and Housing Prices.” Bank of Portugal Working 
Paper No. 8-2011.
Lamont, O. and J. Stein. 1999. “Leverage and 
House-Price Dynamics in U.S. Cities.” RAND	
Journal	of	Economics 30 (3): 498–514.
Meh, C. 2011. “Bank Balance Sheets, Deleveraging 
and the Transmission Mechanism.” Bank	of	
Canada	Review (this issue): 23–34.
Mian, A. and A. Sufi. 2009a. “The Consequences of 
Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 
U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis.” Quarterly	Journal	
of	Economics 124 (4): 1449–96.
———. 2009b. “House Prices, Home-Equity-Based 
Borrowing, and the U.S. Household Leverage 
Crisis.” NBER Working Paper No. 15283.
Ortalo-Magné, F. and S. Rady. 1999. “Boom In, Bust 
Out: Young Households and the Housing Price 
Cycle.” European	Economic	Review 43 (4-6): 
755–66.
Pichette, L. 2004. “Are Wealth Effects Important 
for Canada?” Bank	of	Canada	Review (Spring): 
29–35.
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff. 2009. This	Time	is	
Different:	Eight	Centuries	of	Financial	Folly. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press.
Tomura, H. 2010. “International Capital Flows and 
Expectation-Driven Boom-Bust Cycles in the 
Housing Market.” Journal	of	Economic	Dynamics	
and	Control 34 (10): 1993–2009.
Wong, E., T. Fong, K.-F. Li and H. Choi. 2011. “Loan-
to-Value Ratio as a Macroprudential Tool—
Hong Kong’s Experience and Cross Country 
Evidence.” Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Working Paper No. 01/2011.
Literature Cited (cont’d)
42
MORTGAGE DEBT AND PROCYCLICALITY IN THE HOUSING MARKET
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SUMMER 2011